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THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS. By Raoul Berger.3 Norman, OK.: University 
of Oklahoma Press. 1989. Pp. x, 169. Cloth, $18.95. 
Michael Zuckert4 
"Hope springs eternal" -and a good thing too. Hope is the 
greatest gift nature has given to humankind, for without it we 
would undertake nothing, and, assuming we managed to survive, 
we would become narrow, crabbed, and mean-spirited creatures. 
Legal historians, in particular historians of the fourteenth 
amendment, are an enormously hopeful lot. After many years now 
of serious study of the amendment, of many scholars poring over 
the many pages of the Congressional Globe and the 1866 issues of 
the New York Times and the speeches of Andrew Johnson, after a 
large number of estimable books by generally competent and mostly 
disinterested scholars, can we honestly say we know what the four-
teenth amendment was originally intended to mean? Judging from 
the three recent studies at hand, the answer is no. All three authors 
are more than competent; all three display knowledge of the sources 
and of the previous scholarship; all three are clever men, able to 
formulate and test hypotheses about meaning and cause. Although 
they all show obvious concern for the bearing of the results of their 
I. Professor of Law, Fordham University. 
2. Practicing Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, and Visiting Professor of Law, 
Wake Forest University. 
3. Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School. 
4. Congdon Professor of Political Science, Carleton College. 
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historical research on contemporary constitutional law, none is 
plainly guilty of having allowed zeal for constitutional results today 
to shape his study of the past. None of these studies is, in other 
words, a member of that dread and despicable class, "Law-office 
history." 
Despite all these virtues, the three disagree almost entirely, 
thereby carrying on a tradition of long-standing in this corner of the 
scholarly world. Despite the failure of all their predecessors to dis-
cover an understanding of the fourteenth amendment sufficiently 
persuasive to create a consensus, all three display great hope and 
confidence. For the most part, all three base that hope on a similar 
thought: if the source materials are only set in the right context, 
then, finally, they will speak unequivocally. All meaning, these his-
torians seem to agree, is contextual. The making of the fourteenth 
amendment is part of some larger story, and like an incident in a 
novel, the meaning of the individual event must be seen as part of 
that larger story. 
A reasonable thought, that, but, as the three studies show, one 
that leads to further problems. The most obvious of the problems is 
that each of our authors sets the making of the fourteenth amend-
ment into a different context, as though one of them finds it to be 
part of Moby Dick, while another locates it in The House of Seven 
Gables. 
Robert J. Kaczorowski's study of The Politics of Judicial Inter-
pretation finds the relevant context to be the meaning of the Civil 
War and the transformation that cataclysmic event wrought in the 
entire constitutional system. "The Civil War and Reconstruction 
had a far more revolutionary impact on American constitutionalism 
than scholars have appreciated." "The fundamental constitutional 
issue" at stake in the war was "whether ultimate sovereignty was 
constitutionally delegated to the national or to the state govern-
ments." This was "a conflict between national supremacy and 
union on the one side and state sovereignty and secession on the 
other side." The conflict was resolved on the battlefields in favor of 
national sovereignty and union, and after the war in Congressional 
Reconstruction in favor of the same. 
This context supplies the key to understanding the fourteenth 
amendment (and other reconstruction civil rights legislation), be-
cause a corollary to the conflict about the location of sovereignty 
was a conflict about "where primary authority over the status and 
rights of individuals was located, in the nation or in the states." 
The victory of the North meant the triumph of the federal govern-
ment as "the primary authority over the status and rights of citi-
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zens, . for sovereignty of necessity encompasses such primary 
authority." Since the nation is sovereign, national citizenship is the 
primary citizenship, a conclusion openly trumpeted in the first sen-
tence of the fourteenth amendment. Since the fundamental status 
of persons inheres in their condition as United States citizens, the 
federal government possesses the primary power to define and pro-
tect these rights: "Congress possessed plenary authority to protect 
these rights in whatever manner it deemed appropriate." This con-
gressional "authority over civil rights" was "virtually unlimited." 
Although "Congress chose not to destroy the states as separate 
political entities" there emerged "a new federalism wherein states 
and nation had concurrent responsibility and authority ... to en-
force and protect the civil rights of Americans." 
Having set the fourteenth amendment into this extraordinarily 
sweeping and dramatic interpretation of the age, Kaczorowski pro-
ceeds to tell a compelling story. Unlike most of his predecessors 
(and unlike the other books under review here), Kaczorowski does 
not rehash the old debates in Congress over the various amend-
ments and laws that together made up the civil rights phase of re-
construction. He looks instead to the efforts by federal officials-
U.S. Attorneys, members of the Justice Department, and the federal 
judiciary-to enforce the body of civil rights legislation. To my 
knowledge this story has never been told before, surely not in such 
detail. 
The story shows an active and energetic enforcement effort, by 
no means always successful, but not failing for lack of legal author-
ity. Kaczorowski insists that the new post-war constitutional order 
he describes at first furnished more than enough legal clout to se-
cure civil rights. So far as there were difficulties, the causes lay else-
where, in the very magnitude of the task of enforcing such 
unpopular laws over the entire South with so few practical re-
sources. Yet the effort met with far greater success than is generally 
appreciated. According to Kaczorowski, the federal effort was on 
the brink of crushing the Ku Klux Klan in the early 1870s. 
Kaczorowski believes there was widespread acceptance within 
the legal community-federal officials and judges-between 1866 
and 1873 or so, of the legal doctrine outlined above. The post-war 
civil rights legislation was all deemed constitutional by the over-
whelming majority of state and federal judges who considered it, 
and it provided the basis for large numbers of prosecutions by the 
Department of Justice, which also acted on the basis of the new 
constitutional theory. The incorporation of the Bill of Rights, and 
the idea that the fourteenth amendment reached private conduct-
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doctrines which reappeared in the mid- or late twentieth century, as 
apparent innovations-were commonplace and widely accepted in 
the 1860s and early 1870s. These were not novelties, as historians 
like Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger would have us believe, but 
orthodox opinion in Congress, the Justice Department, and the 
lower federal courts. Especially telling is Kaczorowski's discovery 
that in cases like U.S. v. Mitchell (1872) even the defense conceded 
"that Bill of Rights guarantees were among the privileges and im-
munities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment." 
In Kaczorowski's account, the real innovation occurred when 
the Court later turned against the new constitutional theory. 
Among the most valuable features of Kaczorowski's book is his 
demonstration that the judicial tum against the new Constitution 
and in favor of the old federalism was preceded by the Grant Ad-
ministration's tum away from strenuous efforts to enforce the civil 
rights legislation. Kaczorowski shows how the political consensus 
in favor of civil rights enforcement in the South evaporated over 
time. He presents the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of 
the fourteenth amendment, beginning with Slaughterhouse in 1873, 
as part of this process. The political situation had changed so much 
that even many Republicans who had formerly been partisans of the 
new Constitution and of strong enforcement of civil rights came to 
welcome the Court's burial of their own handiwork, because it pro-
vided them with a decent way out of what had become an unpopu-
lar and hence politically embarrassing position. 
Slaughterhouse and related decisions (e.g., U.S. v. Reese, U.S. 
v. Cruikshank) accelerated the process which had generated them. 
After 1873 lower courts began to question the constitutionality of 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, of 1870 and of 1871, and to quash 
indictments brought under these acts when they didn't declare them 
unconstitutional. The federal justice machinery also lost all zest for 
the business, and soon the country moved entirely on to other 
things. The sands closed over this episode, this effort to vindicate 
the rights of the newest American citizens, so thoroughly that 
hardly a memory of the original post-Civil War landscape re-
mained. The post-Slaughterhouse innovations on behalf of the old 
federalism took on the appearance of original intentions. "And I, 
alone, am left to tell thee." 
Once set in this context, it becomes relatively clear what the 
fourteenth amendment meant: the assignment of custody over the 
fundamental natural and civil rights to the Federal Government, 
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, the grant of plenary power 
to Congress to do whatever is needed to protect and secure rights. 
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Valuable as Kaczorowski's study is, his version of the amend-
ment's context fails in at least three respects. In the first place, his 
formulation of the issue of the Civil War-state v. national sover-
eignty, state v. national custody of civil rights-is too infected by 
Calhounian absolutism. It was Calhoun who insisted that the 
American federal system must be understood in terms of the iron 
logic of sovereignty; in following him Kaczorowski ignores the clas-
sic and, in my opinion, far sounder understanding of federalism ar-
ticulated and defended by the "father of federalism" himself: 
[T]hose who deny the possibility of a political system with a divided sovereignty like 
that of the U.S. must choose between a government purely consolidated, and an 
association of governments purely federal. All republics of the former character, 
ancient or modem, have been found ineffectual for order and justice within, and for 
security without . . . . In like manner, all confederacies, ancient or modem, have 
been either dissolved by the inadequacy of their cohesion, or, as in the modem 
examples, continue to be monuments of the frailties of such forms. 
If, in other words, our federal system fails to conform to the ab-
stract logic of sovereignty, then so much the worse for the abstract 
logic of sovereignty. 
According to Madisonian orthodoxy, sovereignty was an attri-
bute of neither the states nor the federal government. It inhered in 
the people who decreed both sets of governments equally. Neither 
the right of secession, i.e., the right of the states to dissolve the 
union, nor the right of the union to supercede the states follows 
from this orthodox theory. As the Supreme Court put it in the 
post-Civil War case of Texas v. White, the Constitution contem-
plates "an indestructible union of indestructible states." The rejec-
tion of the Southern theory of union on the battlefields of the Civil 
War did not imply embracing the opposite extreme view of a sover-
eign union. 
Thus, according to the sounder views of the nature of our 
union, the question of the allocation of powers to secure rights can-
not be settled by recourse to the abstract question of the locus of 
sovereignty. The original Constitution gave a complex answer to 
the question of where power to secure rights lay, but it would be 
difficult to make a plausible case that this power lay principally with 
the general government. Most, if not all, of the architects of Recon- · 
struction understood the Constitution in this way, and it would be 
very difficult to show that they intended to change that entirely to 
the national sovereignty-plenary power Constitution Kaczorowski 
claims emerged from the Civil War. 
His own book provides little direct evidence on this last issue, 
for he neglects altogether the congressional debates on the amend-
ments and civil rights legislation of the reconstruction era. Much in 
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those debates conflicts with the context into which he sets the four-
teenth amendment. A particularly important instance was John 
Bingham's draft for an amendment, debated in February of 1866 
and, after a mixed reception, postponed indefinitely. That draft 
would have given Congress "power to make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several states and to all per-
sons in the several states equal protection in the rights of life, 
liberty, and property." This proposal would have vested Congress 
more or less with the plenary power Kaczorowski believes the new 
Constitution promoted by the congressional Republicans contained. 
But the congressional Republicans did not react to the proposal as a 
reader of Kaczorowski's hypothesis would expect. They did not see 
it as expressive of the Constitution they already had, nor were they 
pleased with the idea of making this change in the Constitution. 
Finally, Kaczorowski's version of context does not easily co-
here with much of the evidence he himself presents. A U.S. attor-
ney for Mississippi, for example, had serious uncertainties over how 
far the Constitution permitted the Federal Government to reach 
into the sphere of criminal law. "Jacobson ... doubted that 
criminal violations of the rights to life, liberty, and property could 
be brought within Federal Jurisdiction." And Attorney-General 
Akerman was far from certain enough about the matter to reassure 
Jacobson. In another set of 1871 cases Judge Hugh Bond of the 
District Court in North Carolina, a man notoriously sympathetic to 
the aims of congressional reconstruction, vacillated mightily on the 
meaning of the fourteenth amendment. In one case, he went so far 
as to suggest that the fourth amendment remained "a mere restric-
tion on the United States itself." That is, he seemed to believe that 
the fourteenth amendment had not changed the status of the Bill of 
Rights as laid down in Barron v. Baltimore. In another case from 
the very same year, however, Judge Bond upheld the power of Con-
gress to protect against violations of the second amendment by pri-
vate persons in the states. There seems to have been a great deal of 
uncertainty about the scope of the fourteenth amendment, and Kac-
zorowski's own evidence shows federal lawyers spending much time 
and effort attempting to avoid the national sovereignty/plenary 
power theory he attributes to them. The behavior of the actors in 
his story, in other words, does not conform well enough to the plot 
he posits for them. 
Michael K. Curtis focuses his attention somewhat more nar-
rowly on the familiar issue of whether the privileges and immunities 
clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights. 
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He argues the affirmative, as Justice Black did many years ago; but 
he does so with a learning and thoroughness that far surpasses 
either Black or his source, Horace Flack, or any of the other schol-
ars who have taken up this issue in the years since Black's famous 
1949 appendix. 
It is not Black, however, but Charles Fairman and to a lesser 
degree Raoul Berger who form the backdrop for Curtis's effort. 
They both had rejected Black's incorporation thesis, but Curtis be-
lieves, like Kaczorowski, that if one only gets the context straight, 
one can resolve the controversy over the fourteenth amendment and 
the Bill of Rights. Fairman's chief "defect" resulted from his fail-
ure to consider "the larger context out of which the fourteenth 
amendment grew, including the crusade against slavery and for civil 
liberty during the years from 1830 to 1866." Curtis differs from 
Kaczorowski in locating the most relevant context in anti-slavery 
legal and political theory rather than in the great drama of a Civil 
War struggle for sovereignty. Curtis's context, while less pano-
ramic, is in several ways more persuasive and serviceable. Follow-
ing pioneering work by Jacobus ten Broek and others on the role of 
anti-slavery thought, Curtis uses his contextual factors in a specific 
and controlled manner. The Republicans who drafted the amend-
ment accepted the natural rights philosophy expressed in the Decla-
ration of Independence, saw the evils of slavery in terms of the 
violation of these rights, and defined their post-war tasks in terms of 
securing them. Although Curtis does not deny that the Republi-
cans retained some attachment to the old federal system and to 
"states' rights," he identifies the natural rights orientation as far 
more primary and uses it as a clue to their ultimate purposes. 
Slavery was not only itself a violation of natural rights; it pro-
voked violation of other rights, constitutional rights such as the 
rights of free speech and free press. These violations outraged anti-
slavery forces during the ante-bellum era. Southern states, for ex-
ample, attempted to prevent the circulation of any writing challeng-
ing the legitimacy of the peculiar institution. These and other 
violent attacks on free speech and other rights set part of the con-
text for the Republicans during Reconstruction. They were con-
cerned indeed with the plight of the newly freed blacks, but also 
with slavery-inspired misdeeds directed against whites. 
More specifically, the anti-slavery partisans had worked out 
before the war some peculiar theories about various clauses of the 
Constitution, theories that were, perhaps, peculiar to themselves, 
but on the basis of which they drafted the fourteenth amendment. 
According to Curtis, Fairman missed this dimension of context al-
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together and, interpreting the Constitution according to more or-
thodox theories, he was nearly deaf to what the drafters were 
saying. For this reason so many of them, especially John Bingham, 
the chief draftsman of the amendment, seemed to Fairman to be 
speaking utter nonsense most of the time. But once one has the 
code, the otherwise inexplicable becomes perfectly sensible. 
The most important of the Republican theories construed the 
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 1 of the origi-
nal Constitution as a protection of "absolute" rights in addition to 
or instead of "relative" rights. It was not merely a guarantee that 
states extend to citizens of other states the same privileges and im-
munities that they extend to their own citizens, but that all citizens 
are due certain protections as a matter of constitutional right. 
There were two further peculiarities in the Republican theory 
of privileges and immunities which Curtis could have brought out 
more clearly, but which are more or less implicit in his account. 
Although he admits there was some ambiguity and vacillation 
about the content of the rights protected under this clause, the in-
terpretation on the basis of which the amendment was drafted held 
that article IV protected the privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the U.S., not those of citizens of the states. The distinction some-
times thought to have been invented by the Supreme Court in 
Slaughterhouse in fact underlay the original theory of the amend-
ment. The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States were those rights specifically belonging to U.S. citizens by 
virtue of the Constitution or nature of the government of the United 
States. The Republicans believed that among those rights were 
those specified in the Bill of Rights. 
The further peculiarity of Republican theory on the privileges 
and immunities of U.S. citizens, that is, on the Bill of Rights, was 
this: citizens of the U.S. possess these rights, but not entirely as 
legal rights. Vis-a-vis the federal government, they were full legal 
rights, because the Bill of Rights in clear terms forbade the federal 
government from infringing them and thus empowered the courts 
to vindicate those rights when threatened by the federal govern-
ment. But vis-a-vis the states they were less than full rights. 
Although the states had a moral obligation to respect them, deriv-
ing from the oath state officers took to uphold the Constitution, 
there was no constitutional prohibition against the states' abridging 
them, and so neither the courts nor Congress could vindicate these 
rights, these privileges and immunities of United States citizens. 
Bingham thus frequently argued that the fourteenth amend-
ment would create no new rights, but would nonetheless make the 
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Bill of Rights binding against the states. The amendment was built 
on the reading of article IV outlined above, but was more explicit 
than article IV. It protected the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States, (i.e., those rights especially derived from 
the Constitution or the nature of the union) against violation by the 
states, and thereby armed the federal courts and Congress with 
power to intervene against the states if they encroached on these 
rights. 
Fairman never could understand any of this, because he read 
the proceedings with eyes accustomed only to the gloom of more 
orthodox constitutional theory. Since the Supreme Court had es-
tablished in Barron v. Baltimore that the Bill of Rights held only 
against the federal government, Fairman could not understand 
what Bingham and others could mean when they argued that the 
rights in the Bill of Rights were already possessed by citizens, even 
against their states. He could only conclude that Bingham was ex-
traordinarily confused, or extraordinarily ignorant, or had a private 
and secret meaning for the term "Bill of Rights." None of this was 
true: Bingham was a flowery speaker, but he was also an extraordi-
narily clear thinker; he was generally recognized by people in and 
out of Congress as a most able legislator and lawyer (witness the 
very high leadership responsibilities with which he was entrusted-
for example, he served on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 
and was one of the House managers of the impeachment of Andrew 
Johnson) and, as Curtis decisively demonstrates, Fairman was cer-
tainly wrong when he speculated that Bingham had something 
other than the first eight amendments to the Constitution in mind 
when he referred to the Bill of Rights. 
Curtis's interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause 
thus flows naturally and persuasively from his account of the con-
text of the amendment. The broad concern with rights, a substan-
tive concern, not just an anti-discrimination concern, the ante-
bellum Republican worry over violations of the rights of whites as 
well as of blacks in the states, the special theories they developed-
all converge naturally on the idea of incorporation. Curtis thus suc-
cessfully rebuts, in my opinion, the main thrust of Fairman's 
argument. 
Yet not everyone has been convinced, least of all Raoul Berger, 
whose new book reiterates many of the arguments he had earlier 
presented in Government by Judiciary, but with the addition of ex-
plicit, spirited (to say the least), and sometimes line by line argu-
ments directed against Curtis. Curtis's book, he thinks, "is of the 
genre ... advocacy scholarship." It is moved by "passionate dedi-
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cation to a cause ... which is apt to distort the judgement of what 
the facts are, to promote wishful thinking, and to result in partisan 
propaganda." But the disagreement between Berger and Curtis 
does not (in the first instance) so much concern facts as contexts. 
Berger opens his critique with an attempt to undermine Curtis's 
construct of context and to substitute one of his own in the guise of 
"guides to interpretation." That is, the facts do not speak for them-
selves, but require context to make them yield their message. "Cur-
tis lives under the grand illusion that the fourteenth amendment 
was 'produced' by the 'anti-slavery crusade.' " Berger knows better: 
"For understanding the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
continued attachment of the North to States' control of internal af-
fairs is far more important than the abolitionist authority back-
ground upon which Curtis so heavily relies." "In seeking to filter 
antislavery ideology into the thinking of the majority of the framers, 
Curtis is wildly off course." 
Berger's drafters, and indeed the whole North, "remained 
deeply attached to the principle of states' rights," and this distin-
guishes them from Curtis's anti-slavery drafters who were commit-
ted to natural and civil rights above all. Berger does not deny that 
they had some concern for rights: "Outraged by the Black Codes, 
the North set out to protect a set of fundamental rights that would 
enable emancipated slaves to exist." But Berger believes that 
Northerners were uninterested in going further than this minimal 
kind of protection, partly because of "rampant racism in the 
North." Racism was the dominant force in Northern opinion and 
along with it went a "pervasive detestation of the abolitionists." 
Berger's notion of context tells him that Reconstruction legis-
lation must stand at the intersection of his three forces: attachment 
to state autonomy, racism, and a desire to offer minimal protections 
for the rights of the freemen. Curtis's abolitionist amendment can-
not, he thinks, be an event in his novel. The first and in a way the 
most important manifestation of Berger's three forces was the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. It had duly limited ambitions: to protect cer-
tain specified rights, such as the rights to contract, to sue, and to 
give evidence. It protected citizens in these rights not absolutely 
but only against discriminatory treatment by the states. "The bill 
did not postulate an indeterminate catalog of 'absolute rights.' Its 
face shows that it struck at discrimination with respect to enumer-
ated particulars." The rights secured in the Bill of Rights were not 
among those protected by the Civil Rights Act. 
The coverage of the Civil Rights Act is such an important part 
of Berger's story because, he says, "the framers deemed the Bill and 
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the Fourteenth Amendment to be identical," or perhaps better put, 
"[t]he Amendment did not go beyond the Act; the Act was deemed 
to be 'incorporated' in the Amendment." Since abolitionism had so 
little role in the drafting of the Reconstruction legislation, Berger 
eschews any reliance on "peculiar" Republican readings of impor-
tant constitutional provisions. He refuses to read the privileges and 
immunities clause of article IV as Bingham did, but takes the more 
standard approach that Charles Fairman took. In this view, the 
privileges and immunities clause is the substantive core of the 
amendment, and it supplies exactly the coverage that section one of 
the Civil Rights Act had provided. "It protected 'a limited category 
of rights.' " "The right to sue for the protection of those rights was 
embodied in the due process clause." The equal protection clause 
"restated affirmatively the [Civil Rights] Act's negatively framed 
proscription of discrimination," although Berger concludes that this 
clause is superfluous, since the privileges and immunities clause al-
ready does the same. 
Professor Berger deserves great credit for his intellectual inde-
pendence and courage. I am unable, however, to agree with his 
analysis. His version of context stands at the very opposite extreme 
from Kaczorowski's and has even more severe difficulties. In the 
first place, his insistence on the utter primacy of federalism does not 
fit the facts. To take but one very clear instance: the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 of which Berger makes so much was itself a tremendous 
intrusion on the former federal system. It told the states who their 
citizens were; it identified certain rights, which had been within the 
exclusive purview of the states, and prohibited them from discrimi-
nating in the way they made those rights available to their citizens; 
it provided recourse in the federal courts to those who believed they 
had been victims of such discrimination; and it provided penalties 
against state officials who violated its provisions. This last was an 
especially great break with traditional federalism. President John-
son vetoed the bill precisely because it broke so strongly with the 
old federalism. So it is wrong to say that the Northern Republicans 
were committed to preservation of state authority above all else. 
They clearly accepted some change in the old federalism; the real 
question is how much. Berger and Kaczorowski appear to fall into 
the opposite sides of the same error. Kaczorowski noticed that the 
Republicans were willing to set aside at least some elements of the 
old federalism in order to secure rights; he concluded that therefore 
they were ready in principle to scrap it all. Berger noticed that the 
Republicans resisted total centralization, and concluded that there-
fore they were unwilling to change anything. As J.R.R. Tolkien's 
Ents would say, these humans are a hasty lot. 
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Berger's treatment of Northern opinion regarding abolitionism 
also fails to ring true. Reaction to the antislavery movement shifted 
over time; in the immediate wake of the Civil War-that is, at the 
time of the drafting of the Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth 
amendment-public acceptance of the main elements of the anti-
slavery cause was probably at its height. This is visible in the con-
gressional leadership who led those proposals through the 
legislature. As Curtis makes clear, many of the leaders came from 
abolitionist backgrounds. Berger attempts to discredit the aboli-
tionists by pointing out how hated Thadeus Stevens was among 
moderate Republicans. But the fact remains that Stevens was a rec-
ognized leader not merely of the radicals, but of the entire House of 
Representatives-chairman of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, House Chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 
director of the managers appointed by the House to conduct the 
impeachment of Andrew Johnson. I have already mentioned simi-
lar evidence regarding the high standing and prestige of John Bing-
ham in Congress. One of Berger's problems in treating the role of 
abolitionist thought is his inability to distinguish its various shades; 
he pushes all anti-slavery thought into the same category. In fact, 
however, there was much disagreement among the former abolition-
ists, as evidenced by their division into radical and moderate wings. 
Berger, moreover, consistently proves unable to identify the marks 
which truly distinguished one wing from the other. But to dis-
course further on abolitionism would take us too far afield here. 
Even if Berger's broader story about context were more persua-
sive than it is, the rejection of the incorporation thesis does not fol-
low from it so clearly as he thinks. Let us say that the Republicans 
(and the North in general) retained a deep commitment to federal-
ism; let us say that Northern opinion remained racist. It is still 
difficult to see how racism would speak one way or another to the 
incorporation issue. It was not a racial issue; the application of the 
Bill of Rights against the states does not require full racial integra-
tion or black suffrage, the two issues where racial feelings clearly 
did hold many Northerners back. 
It is not even clear that incorporation represents such a major 
breach in traditional federalism as Berger consistently asserts: "Ap-
plication of the Bill of Rights to the States drastically curtails the 
right of the Northern states to control their own internal affairs." 
Maybe so, maybe not. Fairman, in his effort to prove that incorpo-
ration was ridiculous, could come up with only a few (and relatively 
minor) instances where Northern states had provisions and proce-
dures contrary to the Bill of Rights. Apparently, most Northerners 
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agreed that there was no rightful freedom in the states to violate the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. We must recall what Berger often 
seems to forget: all this happened long before the Warren Court 
began to interpret the Bill of Rights in ways that did indeed chal-
lenge many of the prerogatives to which the states had become ac-
customed. In 1866, it was thought that the Northern states were 
already pretty much in conformity with the Bill of Rights, and it 
would, therefore, not be a major alteration of the status quo to make 
such conformity a constitutional requirement. Berger repeatedly 
makes statements like the following: "Curtis would be hard-pressed 
to name one Northern 'politician' who openly preferred federal to 
State control of criminal and civil administration in his own state." 
But this is to set up a straw dichotomy. Incorporation in 1866 did 
not mean "federal control of criminal and civil administration" in 
the states; it meant the prescription of certain limits and procedures 
which were mostly satisfied, or thought to be satisfied, even without 
incorporation. Berger, in other words, regularly exaggerates the 
implications of incorporation for federalism. 
Another nearly certain indication that Berger's use of context 
is leading him astray is the reappearance in his book of Fairman's 
"arrant nonsense" approach to the leading spokesmen for the four-
teenth amendment. "Bingham's remarks are rife with contradic-
tions." Bingham spoke with "glaring inexactitude." "In truth, 
Bingham was utterly confused [not mistaken, but confused] as to 
what Barron v. Baltimore held." It is an almost certain tip-off that 
an historian is not approaching his or her materials with an accu-
rate frame of reference if important historical actors make no sense 
at all to the historian. Important historical actors (and this was 
true for Bingham, Howard, and others involved in the drafting and 
adoption of the amendment) make sense to those around them; that 
is why they are important actors. The historian's task is to bring 
out their sense, not to denounce them as fools. 
These problems with context in Berger are so important be-
cause context plays such a significant role in his history. It leads 
him to establish a very high burden of proof for the incorporation 
thesis to meet-something on the order at least of "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt"; but in practice close to "near certainty." It leads 
him to discount much of the direct evidence supporting incorpora-
tion and to fail to notice much other such evidence. In the former 
category are the extraordinarily important speeches by Bingham 
and Howard in the House and Senate. Bingham wrote the amend-
ment and served on the Joint Committee. Howard reported the 
amendment to the Senate on behalf of the Joint Committee. They 
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were the ones who came to their respective Houses with the specific 
authority to explain the meaning of the amendment as understood 
by the Committee which had prepared and was recommending it. 
All members of both houses would take these explanations as espe-
cially authoritative. All historians therefore should do the same un-
less persuaded by strong evidence to the contrary. 
Both Bingham and Howard said as clearly as they could that 
the amendment would incorporate the Bill of Rights. And no one 
denied this either openly or by clear implication; many things were 
said that do not necessarily imply incorporation, but are compatible 
with it. There is far more evidence of a supportive kind than either 
Berger or Fairman concedes. Some of it appears in Kaczorowski's 
book, as we have already noted. Much of it even appears in Ber-
ger's book. Apparently not noticing how it bears on his own case, 
Berger quotes against Curtis a statement by William D. Kelley, Re-
publican from Pennsylvania, about the evils the Republicans were 
attempting to remedy: "Northerners could go South but once there 
they could not express their thoughts as freemen and receive the 
protection they were entitled to as citizens of the Republic." 
Kelley was complaining of the violation of the rights of whites 
here, and the right he spoke up for was the first amendment right of 
free speech. Richard Yates of Illinois asked in the Senate, along the 
same lines, "Do you suppose any of you can go South and express 
your sentiments freely and in safety?" A particularly telling pas-
sage by James Wilson: blacks "must have the same liberty of 
speech in any part of the South as they have always had in the 
North." And of course Curtis cites many other examples where Bill 
of Rights guarantees are listed among those requiring protection 
under the amendment or the Civil Rights Act. 
Probably the greatest importance of Berger's study lies in his 
unrelenting effort to limit the scope of the fourteenth amendment by 
identifying it entirely with the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Berger's 
attempt to identify the two runs afoul of some very important facts, 
and thereby shows, I think, the inherent limits of the thesis. In the 
first place, the original Bingham draft for the amendment was intro-
duced before the Civil Rights Act; its key language therefore pre-
dated the list of rights in the latter bill. Secondly, despite Berger's 
dismissal of the point, the language of the two is quite different, and 
it seems odd for the framers to aim at nothing other than the consti-
tutionalization of the one in the quite different language of the 
other. If they merely sought to get the Civil Rights Act into the 
Constitution why did they not simply take its first section and use it 
for the amendment? 
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More decisively, Berger cannot make the language of the four-
teenth amendment fit the Civil Rights Act. As he insists through-
out, the Civil Rights Act was limited in two respects: it only 
mandated non-discrimination with respect to a limited set of enu-
merated rights. That is, it did not provide absolute protection for 
those rights, nor did it provide across-the-board protection from 
discrimination. But the fourteenth amendment, even on Berger's 
reading, is different. Even if Berger is correct, for example, about 
the meaning of "privileges or immunities" as identical to the list of 
rights in the Civil Rights Act, he surely must notice that the four-
teenth amendment does not protect them merely against discrimi-
natory treatment. Only if one reads this clause together with the 
equal protection clause does one begin to get something like Ber-
ger's identity between the two reconstruction acts. But the two 
clauses are obviously separate, and obviously have separate force. 
For one thing, the one applies to "citizens" and the other to "per-
sons," a distinction which Berger depreciates, but which has clear 
textual significance. The Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth 
amendment obviously stand as closely related measures, and there-
fore the tendency of many Republicans to blend them together is 
perfectly intelligible, especially in polemical contexts, but Berger's 
attempt to show that they are simply identical does not succeed. It 
is Berger's great virtue that he has made the thesis of identity a very 
explicit theme of his book and has thus unintentionally helped his 
readers to reject this thesis which has always had a certain casual 
plausibility and attractiveness, but which is ultimately untenable. 
The three books reviewed here show that the optimism of four-
teenth amendment historians is not wholly misplaced. We can 
learn from all three, and from Curtis we have findings which in my 
opinion are solid and reliable. This is not to say that his book could 
not use some fine-tuning; occasionally he falls into a Kaczorowski-
like conviction about the thorough and complete remaking of the 
constitutional order. And his study of the incorporation issues 
needs to be supplemented with equally thorough consideration of 
the rest of the first section of the amendment. But for the most part 
he has constructed a plausible version of context that he uses judi-
ciously to render intelligible events and words that have often baf-
fled scholars. 
